ref: 386de35205a7d2b4ac4ea91b0fe8ac3041f7986e
parent: 10e9d8e82cd808b0c3ef64860df2fc4c8f9607be
author: Ori Bernstein <ori@eigenstate.org>
date: Sun Nov 15 00:01:42 EST 2020
git/serve: restrict namespace Use our auth and namespace code to drop access to anything other than our repository early on. This should make git serving more secure. While we're here, fix a few bugs.
--- a/serve.c
+++ b/serve.c
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
#include <u.h>
#include <libc.h>
#include <ctype.h>
+#include <auth.h>
#include "git.h"
-char *pathpfx = "";
-int allowwrite;
+char *pathpfx = "/usr/git";
+char *namespace = nil;
+int allowwrite;
int
fmtpkt(Conn *c, char *fmt, ...)
@@ -277,14 +279,40 @@
}
int
+mkdir(char *dir)
+{
+ char buf[ERRMAX];
+ int f;
+
+ if(access(dir, AEXIST) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if((f = create(dir, OREAD, DMDIR | 0755)) == -1){
+ rerrstr(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if(strstr(buf, "exist") == nil)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ close(f);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
updatepack(Conn *c)
{
- char buf[Pktmax], packtmp[128], idxtmp[128];
+ char buf[Pktmax], packtmp[128], idxtmp[128], ebuf[ERRMAX];
int n, pfd, packsz;
Hash h;
+ /* make sure the needed dirs exist */
+ if(mkdir(".git/objects") == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if(mkdir(".git/objects/pack") == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if(mkdir(".git/refs") == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if(mkdir(".git/refs/heads") == -1)
+ return -1;
snprint(packtmp, sizeof(packtmp), ".git/objects/pack/recv-%d.pack.tmp", getpid());
- snprint(idxtmp, sizeof(idxtmp), ".git/objects/idx/recv-%d.idx.tmp", getpid());
+ snprint(idxtmp, sizeof(idxtmp), ".git/objects/pack/recv-%d.idx.tmp", getpid());
if((pfd = create(packtmp, ORDWR, 0644)) == -1)
return -1;
packsz = 0;
@@ -292,7 +320,13 @@
n = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if(n == 0)
break;
- if(n == -1 || write(pfd, buf, n) != n)
+ if(n == -1){
+ rerrstr(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf));
+ if(strstr(ebuf, "hungup") == nil)
+ return -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if(write(pfd, buf, n) != n)
return -1;
packsz += n;
}
@@ -301,7 +335,7 @@
goto error1;
}
if(indexpack(packtmp, idxtmp, h) == -1){
- dprint(1, "indexing failed\n");
+ dprint(1, "indexing failed: %r\n");
goto error1;
}
if(rename(packtmp, idxtmp, h) == -1){
@@ -321,7 +355,7 @@
int fd, i;
for(i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
- if((fd = create(".git/index9/lock", ORDWR|OEXCL, 0644))!= -1)
+ if((fd = create(".git/_lock", ORDWR|OTRUNC|OEXCL, 0644))!= -1)
return fd;
sleep(250);
}
@@ -374,7 +408,6 @@
ret = 0;
error:
close(lockfd);
- remove(".git/index9/lock");
return ret;
}
@@ -422,7 +455,8 @@
void
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char *p, cmd[32], buf[512], path[512];
+ char *repo, cmd[32], buf[512];
+ char *user;
Conn c;
ARGBEGIN{
@@ -434,6 +468,9 @@
if(*pathpfx != '/')
sysfatal("path prefix must begin with '/'");
break;
+ case 'n':
+ namespace=EARGF(usage());
+ break;
case 'w':
allowwrite++;
break;
@@ -443,18 +480,27 @@
}ARGEND;
gitinit();
- initconn(&c, 0, 1);
+ user = "none";
+ if(allowwrite)
+ user = getuser();
+ if(newns(user, namespace) == -1)
+ sysfatal("addns: %r");
+ if(bind(pathpfx, "/", MREPL) == -1)
+ sysfatal("bind: %r");
+ if(rfork(RFNOMNT) == -1)
+ sysfatal("rfork: %r");
+ initconn(&c, 0, 1);
if(readpkt(&c, buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
sysfatal("readpkt: %r");
- p = parsecmd(buf, cmd, sizeof(cmd));
- if(snprint(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", pathpfx, p) == sizeof(path))
- sysfatal("%s: path too long\n", p);
- cleanname(path);
- if(strncmp(pathpfx, path, strlen(pathpfx)) != 0)
- sysfatal("%s: path escapes prefix", p);
- if(chdir(path) == -1)
- sysfatal("cd %s: %r", path);
+ repo = parsecmd(buf, cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+ cleanname(repo);
+ if(strncmp(repo, "../", 3) == 0)
+ sysfatal("invalid path %s\n", repo);
+ if(bind(repo, "/", MREPL) == -1)
+ sysfatal("enter %s: %r", repo);
+ if(chdir("/") == -1)
+ sysfatal("chdir: %r");
if(access(".git", AREAD) == -1)
sysfatal("no git repository");
if(strcmp(cmd, "git-receive-pack") == 0 && allowwrite)