ref: 24cae65e2e34728d0d46e00b40b1d3fae637a256
parent: 3bc748078a135fc3b31a611c4074f1f416c3e758
author: Timothy B. Terriberry <tterribe@xiph.org>
date: Sun Oct 28 00:37:40 EDT 2012
Fix potential memory leaks added in 3bc74807.
--- a/src/http.c
+++ b/src/http.c
@@ -1586,10 +1586,12 @@
be tried as a rooted name first."
That doesn't give us any security guarantees, of course (a subverted DNS
could fail the original query and our resolver might still retry with a
- local domain appended).*/
- if(ip==NULL&&strchr(host,'.')==NULL)return 0;
+ local domain appended).
+ If we don't have a FQDN, just set the number of names to 0, so we'll fail
+ and clean up any resources we allocated.*/
+ if(ip==NULL&&strchr(host,'.')==NULL)nsan_names=0;
/*RFC 2459 says there MUST be at least one, but we don't depend on it.*/
- nsan_names=sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(san_names);
+ else nsan_names=sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(san_names);
for(sni=0;sni<nsan_names;sni++){
const GENERAL_NAME *name;
name=sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(san_names,sni);
@@ -1625,13 +1627,12 @@
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(san_names,GENERAL_NAME_free);
if(addr!=NULL)freeaddrinfo(addr);
}
- else{
+ /*Do the same FQDN check we did above.
+ We don't do this once in advance for both cases, because in the
+ subjectAltName case we might have an IPv6 address without a dot.*/
+ else if(strchr(host,'.')!=NULL){
int last_cn_loc;
int cn_loc;
- /*Do the same FQDN check we did above.
- We don't do this once in advance for both cases, because in the
- subjectAltName case we might have an IPv6 address without a dot.*/
- if(strchr(host,'.')==NULL)return 0;
/*If there is no subjectAltName, match against commonName.
RFC 6125 says that at least one significant CA is known to issue certs
with multiple CNs, although it SHOULD NOT.