shithub: riscv

ref: bab31af707aab34da9ba2b2975c05d7b3cb568cc
dir: /sys/src/ape/lib/openssl/demos/tunala/cb.c/

#include "tunala.h"

#ifndef NO_OPENSSL

/* For callbacks generating output, here are their file-descriptors. */
static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_info = NULL;
static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_verify = NULL;
/* Output level:
 *     0 = nothing,
 *     1 = minimal, just errors,
 *     2 = minimal, all steps,
 *     3 = detail, all steps */
static unsigned int cb_ssl_verify_level = 1;

/* Other static rubbish (to mirror s_cb.c where required) */
static int int_verify_depth = 10;

/* This function is largely borrowed from the one used in OpenSSL's "s_client"
 * and "s_server" utilities. */
void cb_ssl_info(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
{
	const char *str1, *str2;
	int w;

	if(!fp_cb_ssl_info)
		return;

	w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
	str1 = (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT ? "SSL_connect" : (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT ?
				"SSL_accept" : "undefined")),
	str2 = SSL_state_string_long(s);

	if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) %s\n", str1, str2);
	else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
		if (ret == 0)
			fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
/* In a non-blocking model, we get a few of these "error"s simply because we're
 * calling "reads" and "writes" on the state-machine that are virtual NOPs
 * simply to avoid wasting the time seeing if we *should* call them. Removing
 * this case makes the "-out_state" output a lot easier on the eye. */
#if 0
		else if (ret < 0)
			fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
#endif
	}
}

void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp)
{
	fp_cb_ssl_info = fp;
}

static const char *int_reason_no_issuer = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT";
static const char *int_reason_not_yet = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID";
static const char *int_reason_before = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD";
static const char *int_reason_expired = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED";
static const char *int_reason_after = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD";

/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) And since then, mutilated ... */
int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
	char buf1[256]; /* Used for the subject name */
	char buf2[256]; /* Used for the issuer name */
	const char *reason = NULL; /* Error reason (if any) */
	X509 *err_cert;
	int err, depth;

	if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify || (cb_ssl_verify_level == 0))
		return ok;
	err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
	err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
	depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);

	buf1[0] = buf2[0] = '\0';
	/* Fill buf1 */
	X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf1, 256);
	/* Fill buf2 */
	X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf2, 256);
	switch (ctx->error) {
	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
		reason = int_reason_no_issuer;
		break;
	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
		reason = int_reason_not_yet;
		break;
	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
		reason = int_reason_before;
		break;
	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
		reason = int_reason_expired;
		break;
	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
		reason = int_reason_after;
		break;
	}

	if((cb_ssl_verify_level == 1) && ok)
		return ok;
	fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
	if(reason)
		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%s\n", reason);
	else
		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%d\n", err);
	if(cb_ssl_verify_level < 3)
		return ok;
	fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> subject = %s\n", buf1);
	fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> issuer  = %s\n", buf2);
	if(!ok)
		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
			X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
	fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> verify return:%d\n",ok);
	return ok;
}

void cb_ssl_verify_set_output(FILE *fp)
{
	fp_cb_ssl_verify = fp;
}

void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth)
{
	int_verify_depth = verify_depth;
}

void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level)
{
	if(level < 4)
		cb_ssl_verify_level = level;
}

RSA *cb_generate_tmp_rsa(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
{
	/* TODO: Perhaps make it so our global key can be generated on-the-fly
	 * after certain intervals? */
	static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
	if(!rsa_tmp)
		rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
	return rsa_tmp;
}

#endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */