ref: c23504631008ce0bfaa5bec48acb2b04f4b49fd9
dir: /sys/src/ape/lib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c/
/* p12_kiss.c */
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
* project 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */
static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
static int parse_bags( STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
char *keymatch);
static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
/* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert
* and other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL,
* or it should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be
* passed unitialised.
*/
int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
{
/* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
if(!p12) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
return 0;
}
/* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */
if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL)) {
if (!(*ca = sk_X509_new_null())) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
if(pkey) *pkey = NULL;
if(cert) *cert = NULL;
/* Check the mac */
/* If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases
* to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that
* under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
* password are two different things...
*/
if(!pass || !*pass) {
if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL;
else if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = "";
else {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca))
{
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
if (cert && *cert) X509_free(*cert);
if (ca) sk_X509_pop_free(*ca, X509_free);
return 0;
}
/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
{
STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
int i, bagnid;
PKCS7 *p7;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
char keymatch = 0;
if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) {
p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i);
bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
} else continue;
if (!bags) {
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,
&keyid, &keymatch)) {
sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
}
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
if (keyid) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keyid);
return 1;
}
static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
char *keymatch)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value (bags, i),
pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid,
keymatch)) return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#define MATCH_KEY 0x1
#define MATCH_CERT 0x2
#define MATCH_ALL 0x3
static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
char *keymatch)
{
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
X509 *x509;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL, *ckid = NULL;
ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_friendlyName)))
fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID))) {
lkey = attrib->value.octet_string;
ckid = lkey;
}
/* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */
if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) {
if (*keyid) {
if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL;
} else {
if (!(*keyid = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(lkey))) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PARSE_BAG,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
}
switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag))
{
case NID_keyBag:
if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag))) return 0;
*keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
break;
case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
return 0;
*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
if (!(*pkey)) return 0;
*keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
break;
case NID_certBag:
if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate )
return 1;
if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0;
if(ckid)
{
if (!X509_keyid_set1(x509, ckid->data, ckid->length))
{
X509_free(x509);
return 0;
}
}
if(fname) {
int len, r;
unsigned char *data;
len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
if(len > 0) {
r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
OPENSSL_free(data);
if (!r)
{
X509_free(x509);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (lkey) {
*keymatch |= MATCH_CERT;
if (cert) *cert = x509;
else X509_free(x509);
} else {
if(ca) sk_X509_push (*ca, x509);
else X509_free(x509);
}
break;
case NID_safeContentsBag:
return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen,
pkey, cert, ca, keyid, keymatch);
break;
default:
return 1;
break;
}
return 1;
}